These figures and labels — including every “verified” — are the old method’s, frozen as of 27 Oct 2026 while the method is revised. Nothing here is updated until launch: any “measured daily” or “one snapshot every day” line below describes the old schedule. The new method will be published at least 7 days before the new site. The new figures follow at launch.
Notice, 16 November 2026: the new site is planned for 2 December 2026 (the notice of 5 November said 18 November). It applies Methodology 2026.12; Methodology 2026.11 never takes effect. Read the second notice →
Methodology
How AQUIX decides what counts as x402 revenue, and what it does not claim to know. Every figure on this site is reconstructed from public Base data, so anyone can check it without an account.
Snapshot 2026-10-27 · 995 published addresses · methodology v3.2
What AQUIX does not measure
Everything below is outside what this site can determine. It is listed first so a reader does
not have to infer it from silence.
Whether an address is an AI agent
Nothing in chain data tells software from a person at a keyboard. The register measures economic behaviour and says so on every row.
Autonomy, or which model is used
A payment looks the same whether a human pressed the button or a program did, and the chain records no model.
Who operates an address
A registrable domain leaves a registration trail; a subdomain on a shared platform, a tunnel endpoint or a bare IP leaves none. Where identity cannot be established it is left blank rather than guessed.
Revenue that never touched the chain
Invoices, subscriptions, card payments and off-chain settlement are invisible here. An address earning mostly off-chain will look small.
Other chains
Only Base is published. Solana data is collected but not yet assessed, and is not shown.
Settlement schemes other than EIP-3009 exact
x402 defines more than one scheme. AQUIX reconstructs the exact scheme; money moved by another route is real and is not counted as x402-verified.
What is measured
x402 revenue, verified.
Every dollar in it is reconstructed from an x402 exact-scheme settlement on Base carrying a
matching EIP-3009 payment authorisation. If we cannot tie a dollar to an x402 payment, it is not in
this number.
Every published address is measured twice: what arrived by any route, and the part we can
tie to an x402 settlement. The second is always the smaller.
Why we keep the two apart. These addresses receive money for many reasons, and
only some of it is x402. For some addresses almost all of what they received did not come through an
x402 payment we can reconstruct. Both figures are true; only one is x402 revenue. Calling the larger
one “x402 revenue” would be a claim we cannot support, so it is shown as what it is: USDC
received by any route.
kept = received − outflow, never below zero. Kept and received are never added together.
Received is every USDC dollar that arrived at an address. Outflow is every dollar it sent
out. Kept is the difference, floored at zero. A payment processor can move a lot of money and keep
almost none of it, so ranking by volume would put the busiest plumbing at the top of a list of earners.
The x402 Seller Registry is one list, ranked by the x402 revenue we can verify.
Each row carries its role — service, circular flow, conduit or wallet software — so a
payment processor is shown as one rather than counted as an earner. Kept is published beside it.
Outflow and pass-through are different.Outflow is lifetime: every dollar
an address sent out, at any time. Pass-through is structural: the address forwards money onward
inside the same transaction that paid it. An address can send out everything it received and
have no pass-through. The composition table on the home page uses pass-through; every dollar figure
uses outflow.
Outflow counts USDC only, so kept is a ceiling: an address paid in USDC that
spends in ETH shows no outflow. Where we have measured ETH outflow for an address, its page says so.
No dollar value is given to any token: pricing many assets at one instant would produce a figure
we could not defend the next day.
Not every token transfer is real outflow. Anyone can emit a transfer event naming someone
else as the sender, so tokens an address never received are excluded, and its page reports how many.
Some of those tokens copy the USDC name using lookalike letters from other alphabets; our detector for
that is incomplete, so counts are always “at least”. Tokens are identified by
contract address, never by symbol.
The reality ratio is how much of the money that moved actually stayed: kept divided by received.
Kept is a ceiling, never an understatement. It is floored at zero, so an address
that sent out more than it received shows $0, not a negative. Published kept can overstate
what was kept and never understates it.
Who the x402 sellers are
The register is called the x402 Seller Registry because that is what it measures: sellers paid
through x402 — APIs, data feeds, compute, crawlers and payment plumbing. Some of them may be AI
agents or may be paid by AI agents; chain data cannot show which, so we publish what the money does and
make no claim about who or what is behind an address.
Every address we saw on the rail from 2026-10-16 to 2026-10-22, by what its behaviour looks
like. Counted, not estimated:
What it looks like
Addresses
Share
PASSENGER
9,375
69.0%
UNDECIDABLE
3,338
24.6%
BOT-SHAPED
501
3.7%
EARNER
313
2.3%
CONDUIT
53
0.4%
INFRASTRUCTURE
10
0.1%
Of 13,590 addresses, 313 —
2.3% — behave like something earning a living. The rest are paying,
passing through, or carrying other people’s money.
This is why the number of published addresses is small. It is not a gap in coverage:
most addresses on a payment rail are not businesses, and a register that claimed otherwise would
be measuring traffic and calling it commerce.
How a payment is recognised
AQUIX reads the x402 payment rail on Base. Real USDC paid for services, settled on-chain via
EIP-3009transferWithAuthorization, and reconstructed to the cent.
What this number does not include. x402 defines more than one settlement scheme.
AQUIX reconstructs the exact scheme, which settles on-chain via EIP-3009 and can therefore be
checked transfer by transfer. Payments settled through other schemes are not counted here —
including usage-based billing that settles through a different contract, and batched or credit-backed
settlement, which may not touch the chain at all. As those schemes are adopted, this figure covers a
smaller share of x402 activity. A fall in it is not evidence that sellers earn less.
A USDC transfer is counted as an x402 payment only when its transaction also carries an
AuthorizationUsed event whose authorizer is the same party that sent the transfer.
That is the buyer's own signature on the payment, on-chain, and it is what separates a paid API call
from an ordinary token movement.
Whether a payment counts is decided from the chain alone. Which addresses we look at is found through the facilitators we know, so an address no known facilitator settles for can be missed.
What the verdicts mean
Figures are measurements. A verdict is a classification: our judgement, reached by the
published rules on this page from those figures. It describes how money behaves at an address
— not whether the address is good, and not who operates it.
The full definitions, and the evidence, identity and status shown beside every
verdict, live on the definitions page.
Service
Paid through x402, and not identified as a router, a rail or wallet software. Full definition.
Conduit
A payment router, rail or facilitator, identified by its role in the protocol. Full definition.
Circular flow
No named rule was decisive, and a large share of what it received went back to its own payers. Full definition.
Wallet software
A wallet product rather than a business, identified from its code or a published deployment. Full definition.
322 of the services keep less than 0.05% of what they receive. The verdict describes how an address was admitted, not how much it kept.
Why "circular flow" exists, and what it does not say
Our rules that promote an address to a service refuse to do so when too much of its
income returns to its own payers — a service that hands the money back is not earning it. But that test
only runs when one of those rules fires. Where no named rule was decisive, the address used to be
described as a service anyway, and the test was never applied.
circulation = money returned to its own payers ÷ money received.
Above the limit our rules set, and with no named rule behind the verdict, we publish the address as
circular flow rather than as a service, and we print its percentage.
This is a statement about the money, not about the operator. Value returning to
the same counterparties is exactly what a trading program, a settlement loop or a refund flow looks like.
AQUIX publishes the measurement and the fact that no rule decided it. It does not infer intent, and
it is not an accusation of wrongdoing.
Nothing is removed from the registry by this. These addresses keep their place, their
figures and every dollar; what changes is the claim the page makes about them.
Older pages and each address’s verdict history may show the classifier’s earlier
labels. Each night’s stored classification is never rewritten. The label a page shows is worked out when the page is built, from today’s inputs, so a past day’s label cannot always be rebuilt.
The signals, and why count alone is not one
Real dollars captured, payer diversity and amount variety, read from the chain.
Transaction count alone can mislead, so it is weighed against them.
Payer diversity
How many distinct addresses paid. Many independent payers is strong evidence of demand from outside. One payer is not evidence of a loop: it means this signal can tell us little about that address, so the verdict rests on the others. Whether money went back to the people who sent it is a separate measurement, and it is the one that decides. A single-payer address is the weakest case this signal can describe, and their number is published.
Amount variety
How many distinct payment amounts appear. One amount is not a finding on its own: on a rail built for machine payments, a fixed per-call price is normal pricing. It is read with payer diversity, timing and where the money went, never alone.
Shared funding
Payer counts can be forged: two hundred “different” payers funded by one wallet is one payer. AQUIX can trace where payers were first funded and say when they lead back to one source. This check has not yet been run on most published addresses: a check for payers funded by one source has been run on only part of the register.
Volume backing
Whether headline volume is backed by payer diversity and amount variety, or by repetition. Elevated means the volume is not matched by the diversity behind it.
Confidence
How much data stands behind the verdict — not how good the address is. High, Medium or Low, with the payer and amount counts behind it shown beside it.
One payer is not a disqualification. It is the least evidence a verdict can rest on, which is why it is counted.
Names, and how much a name is worth
A name is only shown when a public source carries it, and the source and its kind are published
beside it. AQUIX never invents a label.
Name verified
A second, independent signal agreed — a Basename resolved on-chain, or a service name the operator declares in a public x402 directory and serves from its own registered domain.
Domain
The domain actually serving the address’s endpoints. Observed, not attested.
Self-declared
The operator states this name in a public directory and AQUIX has found no second source for it.
Unnamed
The operator has registered no name in any public directory, on-chain registry or manifest we check.
A brand in a subdomain is not an identity. A reseller can serve
somebrand.example.com without any relationship to that brand, so a declared name only counts
as corroborated when it matches the operator's own registrable domain. Publishing a third party's
name as an address's identity would misattribute the revenue.
What we remove, and why
Not every address paid on this rail is a business being paid. Some are the rail: payment-protocol contracts, merchant disbursement plumbing, wallet software. They receive real USDC and would otherwise sit at the very top of this registry as the largest earners on Base. AQUIX removes 38 addresses by hand, and every one is listed here with how we know.
This is a hand-maintained backstop, so it can only ever contain what we have already gone and found. It is not a filter that catches this shape automatically — anything of this kind we have not found is in the registry right now, uncounted. That is the honest limit of the method, and it is why the list is published rather than described.
Removed from the register (38)
ERC3009PaymentCollector 0x35e6cb35…cd1f0e
payment rail / protocol contract — Commerce Payments (AuthCaptureEscrow ecosystem) · identity established by published · source
ERC3009PaymentCollector 0xa8a80741…91d988
payment rail / protocol contract — Commerce Payments (AuthCaptureEscrow ecosystem) · identity established by published · source
RelayRouterV3 0xb92fe925…4fff4f
payment rail / protocol contract — Relay (relay.link) cross-chain routing · identity established by published · source
AuthCaptureEscrow 0xbdea0d1b…420cff
payment rail / protocol contract — Commerce Payments Protocol · identity established by published · source
ERC3009PaymentCollector 0x0e3df951…7a7757
payment rail / protocol contract — Commerce Payments Protocol · identity established by published · source
Permit2PaymentCollector 0x992476b9…f0ab26
payment rail / protocol contract — Commerce Payments Protocol · identity established by published · source
PreApprovalPaymentCollector 0x1b77abd7…b94bc6
payment rail / protocol contract — Commerce Payments Protocol · identity established by published · source
SpendPermissionPaymentCollector 0x8d9f3493…4e7eaa
payment rail / protocol contract — Commerce Payments Protocol · identity established by published · source
OperatorRefundCollector 0x934907bf…02fa5d
payment rail / protocol contract — Commerce Payments Protocol · identity established by published · source
Transfers 0xeade6be0…a14971
payment rail / protocol contract — Coinbase Commerce Onchain Payment Protocol (predecessor of Commerce Payments) · identity established by published · source
x402ExactPermit2Proxy 0x402085c2…e20001
payment rail / protocol contract — x402 · identity established by published · source
Permit2 0x00000000…c78ba3
payment rail / protocol contract — Uniswap Permit2 · identity established by published · source
Relay Protocol: Approval Proxy 0xbbbfd134…b93d98
payment rail / protocol contract — Relay Protocol · identity established by published · source
Relay Solver 0xf70da978…a3dbef
payment rail / protocol contract — Relay Protocol · identity established by published · source
SplitsWarehouse 0x8fb66f38…661fb8
payment rail / protocol contract — 0xSplits v2 · identity established by published · source
Splits Swapper Implementation 0x7fcdd451…95fda7
payment rail / protocol contract — 0xSplits · identity established by published · source
RelayApprovalProxyV3 0xccc88a9d…c315be
payment rail / protocol contract — Relay Protocol · identity established by bytecode · identified from contract bytecode
splitsSmartVault 0x325bdf6f…e1d430
payment rail / protocol contract — 0xSplits · identity established by bytecode · identified from contract bytecode
Coinflow Credits Contract 0x853f2c11…2058f8
payment rail / protocol contract — Coinflow · identity established by bytecode · identified from contract bytecode
Coinflow payment router 0x31d058b5…962cd7
payment rail / protocol contract — Coinflow · identity established by bytecode · identified from contract bytecode
0xf6ee347d…043bd2
payment rail / protocol contract — Coinflow · identity not established — excluded on payment topology alone; no verified name · identified from contract bytecode
merchant disbursement contract — Commerce Payments (AuthCaptureEscrow ecosystem) · identity established by bytecode · source
UniswapV3Pool instance 0x18b497f7…859f47
not a service — AMM liquidity pool · identity established by bytecode · source
0x2fc617e9…b3befe
not a service — bridge and on-ramp wallet · identity not established — excluded on payment topology alone; no verified name · source
Uniswap V4 PoolManager 0x498581ff…652b2b
not a service — AMM venue · identity established by published · source
RelayDepository 0x4cd00e38…38bc31
not a service — Relay bridge deposit contract · identity established by published · source
0x6d8675a5…3329c8
not a service — exchange deposit address (one user endpoint) · identity not established — excluded on payment topology alone; no verified name · source
BaseSettler 0x7747f8d2…7f2359
not a service — 0x Protocol settlement contract · identity established by published · source
UniswapV3Pool instance 0xb4cb8009…bb00e5
not a service — AMM liquidity pool · identity established by published · source
Gnosis Safe multisig instance 0xbb1b19f1…0e0c99
not a service — custody wrapper · identity established by published · source
UniswapV3Pool instance 0xd0b53d92…98f224
not a service — AMM liquidity pool · identity established by published · source
Identified as wallet software, and published (13)
These are not removed. They are wallet or smart-account software rather than a business being paid, so they appear in the registry badged Wallet software, and are excluded from any count of earners. The manifest below assigns that role; it does not exclude the address.
How we know. Every address here was identified from the account’s own on-chain code — an EIP-7702 delegate or a smart-account implementation whose bytecode names the wallet software. That is the source for this class, and it is stated here because the wallet manifest records the software rather than a per-address citation.
0x08ae9867…912bb0
wallet software — ZeroDev kernel
0x13bfc43f…0eb9a7
wallet software — MetaMask EIP-7702
0x309ecd45…f6d53f
wallet software — Trust Wallet
0x37b2a541…8533f1
wallet software — MetaMask EIP-7702
0x3803a192…41101b
wallet software — MetaMask EIP-7702
0x6302d9e6…35ad57
wallet software — ZeroDev kernel
0x6351c235…250d62
wallet software — Uniswap Calibur
0x636678e4…d3f1e2
wallet software — MetaMask EIP-7702
0x6462f8f3…acc1d0
wallet software — Uniswap Calibur
0x7d2ceb7a…b7bcfe
wallet software — MetaMask EIP-7702
0x888e5b82…7a7468
wallet software — Trust Wallet
0xcf9223ec…e342fb
wallet software — MetaMask EIP-7702
0xf1eb97dd…8c3fa3
wallet software — Uniswap Calibur
Claimed as infrastructure elsewhere, and not removed (9)
Addresses that other lists name as rails, which we checked and did not accept.
X402ExactPermit2Proxy
Not deployed on Base — a call for its code returned nothing on 2026-07-27, although the address is widely repeated in secondary write-ups. The canonical address in the x402 specification is deployed and is the one used. Recorded here so it is never re-added on the strength of a search result.
Relay ApprovalProxy v3
Not deployed on Base — a call for its code returned nothing. The published version table it appears in is not Base-specific, and those docs warn that addresses differ from chain to chain.
Relay ApprovalProxy v2.1
Not deployed on Base — a call for its code returned nothing.
Relay ApprovalProxy v2
Not deployed on Base — a call for its code returned nothing.
Relay Router v3
Not deployed on Base — a call for its code returned nothing.
Relay Router v2.1
Not deployed on Base — a call for its code returned nothing.
Relay Router v2
Not deployed on Base — a call for its code returned nothing.
0x86f8c5821f6c61b2296bba9cd2526415a385bc13
Not a disburser — a smart wallet. Its source is verified as a proxy to a Biconomy smart-account implementation, created by a bundler. A merchant using a smart account is still a merchant.
0x9c955c40dc98fce89a133f402ffbf94070e6e299
Rejected as a candidate. It is a verified proxy, but the implementation it points to is unnamed, so there is no identification at any tier. It credits one merchant, worth $607 — too little evidence for too little money.
What this list cannot cover
Most x402 facilitators are ordinary wallet addresses rather than contracts, and no public roster of them exists for Base. This list therefore cannot be complete for facilitators.
0xSplits creates a new vault for every split, so they cannot be listed by address. They are recognised by the shape of their bytecode instead.
A protocol deployed after this list was last updated is invisible to it until someone refreshes it. That is a limit of any hand-maintained list, and it is stated here rather than hidden.
One address holds $1,998,877 from 1,223 payers, is unverified on BaseScan, and carries the bytecode string “LBSGasless”, which has no presence on the public web. It is shaped like a gasless relayer but is unnamed. It is excluded on structural identification — unconfirmed (decided 2026-09-17). A bytecode string can show what is present; it can never show what is absent, so it may still be infrastructure.
An address receiving $820,460 is a Coinbase deposit address. Decided 2026-09-17: it is not removed. An exchange deposit address is one user’s endpoint rather than shared infrastructure, and a merchant routing revenue straight to their own deposit address would otherwise be wrongly excluded.
Six Safe v1.4.1 multisig wallets appear in the register, $32,438 in total. Decided 2026-09-17: they are not removed. A Safe is a custody wrapper, and a merchant receiving into one is still a merchant. The Safe factory would be infrastructure; an individual Safe is not.
Registry #120 is a contract, not a person or a business, and it cannot be called by the people paying it: its only state-changing function requires the caller to be one specific other contract. It holds $1,399 from 147 payers. It is NOT removed from the register, because our infrastructure list identifies NAMED protocol deployments and we have not been able to name this one. What we measured is published here rather than acted on: an unnamed contract is not the same as an identified rail.
Twenty-four addresses in the register are EIP-7702-delegated wallets and three are ERC-1967 smart accounts, $649,361 in total. A merchant using a smart wallet is still a merchant, so these are not removed.
Two distinct TokenStore implementations exist, measured 2026-07-27, and they are not byte-identical. Any rule that matches clones against a single implementation address or a single code hash therefore catches only one family. The matcher needs a set of known implementations, and that set grows whenever an operator redeploys.
TokenStore is a clone template rather than one address: both entries are minimal proxies from the same template, and there are almost certainly more clones than the two observed — likely one per merchant. Listing them by address can never be complete; the durable fix is to match the clone template itself.
Discovery is bounded by who is already tracked. Disbursers were found by inverting the creditor relation over the tracked recipients, so a disburser whose merchants are all untracked is invisible to this method. Roughly ten thousand addresses receive x402 money behind two rails against eight tracked, so this list is a floor rather than a census.
A disburser entry admits addresses, and its failure mode is the mirror of a rail’s: a wrong rail entry excludes a real merchant, while a wrong disburser entry admits something that is not one. The structural tier is where that risk concentrates.
A rail that also disburses is the norm rather than the exception — four of the twelve candidates found are already listed as rails. The two lists overlap by design, and the scope rule uses their union.
What AQUIX does not claim to know
Stated limits are part of the output, not a failure of it.
The biggest limit, stated as a number.45.49% of the dollars these
addresses received are proven x402 by the settlement record — every one of them is a
USDC transfer whose transaction carried a matching EIP-3009 authorisation, checked per
payment, not sampled. The other
54.51%
($78,498,510.18) is money that genuinely arrived and that we cannot show
was x402. It is not excluded, hidden or estimated — it is published beside the proven
figure and counted separately, and this is why the site leads with the smaller number.
Two instruments, and they answer different questions. The figure
above is computed from every settlement on the record. The provenance grade on an address’s
page is computed from a sample of at most six payments and describes the route a
payment took, not whether a dollar was x402. A reader who takes the sampler for the proof will
under-read us; a reader who takes it for a lifetime judgement will over-read us. They are labelled
separately for that reason.
Settlements we did not capture
Measured, not estimated: across two independent windows on
2026-09-17 we captured 99.63% and 99.64% of x402 settlement value
on the rail. The remainder — about 0.36%, roughly $425 in a window carrying
$118,000 — is settlements routed through low-volume facilitators our learned set had not
yet recognised. Our set of known facilitators is refreshed daily from recent activity, so a facilitator that recurs is recognised; payments it settled before then are not re-read.
This figure prices what we miss within the EIP-3009 record; it does not bound
schemes that leave no such record at all — see the next two entries.
Base only
AQUIX measures the x402 rail on Base. Other chains are a different category and are measured separately, if at all — see below.
One hop
When a tracked address forwards money onward, AQUIX measures what it kept, not who ultimately received it.
Settlement methods
The x402 exact scheme has two asset-transfer methods on EVM. AQUIX reads EIP-3009, the one the specification recommends. A second method, Permit2, exists for tokens without EIP-3009; we do not read it, and measured it on 2026-08-11 at about $7 per week in USDC on Base. The upto scheme — metered billing, priced after the work is done — uses Permit2 only, so it is invisible to our method by construction rather than by choice.
What nobody can read
The batch-settlement scheme leaves no on-chain record at all. It returns a commitment identifier rather than a transaction hash, and settlement is deferred to a network binding. No observer can reconstruct it from a chain, including us. ERC-7710 delegation is also outside what we read; when we checked on 2026-08-11, its reference Delegation Manager had no code on Base.
Kept is a ceiling
Floored at zero — see “What is measured”.
Unregistered operators
Most operators publish nothing about themselves, so most published addresses carry no public identity beyond the address itself. The register says so rather than filling the gap with a guess.
Forward-only layers
Some measurements begin on a declared date and are never backfilled. A day that was never measured is left empty rather than estimated.
Snapshots, not a live feed
One snapshot per day at 07:00 UTC, timestamped and archived. The figures here are from 2026-10-27.
Data coverage
AQUIX began reading the Base x402 rail on 28 June 2026. A day is published only once its blocks have
been read without a gap — the coverage record decides, not the calendar.
That is why the first published day is 2026-07-07 rather than the day reading began: everything before it failed the contiguity test and is shown as unmeasured.
A server storage failure interrupted collection. 3 mornings between 2026-08-30 and 2026-09-02 produced no snapshot, and the gap is not continuous — collection resumed for part of it. These mornings are published as unmeasured, never as zero.
Payment data for that period has been re-read from the chain.
Three corrections touch this period, and each is recorded in full in the correction log. The settled half of the daily figures was missing for eleven days and has been recomputed from the settlement store (correction #6). That recomputation was itself wrong for the three largest of those days and was repaired on 2026-09-14 (correction #8). Separately, 67 published addresses carried a provenance grade weaker than the evidence we held, and the pages now lead with the settlement record (correction #7). No money figure was ever in question in any of the three — x402 revenue, from settlement records, is computed from the settlement store (under the new method it is called verified only once the per-address check passes; any “verified” label still on a frozen page is the old method’s). In these figures, received is the address’s balance plus the money it sent out; kept is received minus money out, never below $0. On the charts, days recovered this way are drawn paler and outlined, because the money was reconstructed from chain while no verdict was taken that morning and none can be. Where a day shows the settled figure in place of an all-route one that was never measured, the bar is lower than a normal day and is marked and labelled as such rather than compared to one.
Two counts, and they are not the same thing.Mornings with no collection at all — the run did not happen and no snapshot exists.
That is the set named above, derived from the day pages this build contains, not typed.
Days with no verdict — 20–31 August and 2 September, a wider
window. For these the money was later re-read from the chain, but no judgement
was taken on the morning and none can be added afterwards, because a verdict records what could
be verified on the day it was written. Those dates therefore carry money and no verdict. A day
can be in the second set without being in the first.
Other chains — measured separately, and labelled
These are not counted in the figures above. They are a different category of number and are
labelled as such rather than blended into a headline.
Bittensor — subnet emissions
Emissions are verifiable per subnet, but the primitive is emitted TAO. That is not customer revenue, and it is not added to it.
Virtuals — Agent Commerce Protocol
Token, market cap and holders are checkable on-chain; reported revenue lives in a private ledger. AQUIX would show what is verifiable and label the rest as reported.
Olas, Fetch
Not measured. Listed so the boundary of this audit is explicit.
How often we are wrong
Every figure below is measured, not asserted, and is regenerated from the record. Most
registries publish an accuracy claim. This one publishes its errors.
Self-contradiction rate (lower bound)
A published address counts here when the evidence stored beside its verdict contradicts
that verdict — a loop verdict on an address that sent nothing out, a judgement passed on an
empty sample, an address in scope for a register of paid x402 sellers with no payment recorded.
Published addresses whose stored evidence contradicts their verdict. Does not measure wrongly excluded addresses or internally consistent mistakes. Verify this figure.
Nought per cent is not a claim of
accuracy, and we will not let it be read as one. It means only that no published verdict is
refuted by evidence already sitting in our own store. That is the weakest possible test to pass:
it cannot see an address we wrongly excluded, and it cannot see a verdict that is wrong in a way our
record is internally consistent about. The number below is the one that should worry a reader.
Thin-evidence verdicts
A published address counts here when its verdict rests on a single sampled payer. That is the
least evidence a verdict can rest on. It is not a claim that the verdict is wrong.
Published addresses whose verdict rests on a single sampled payer. Payer diversity is our own named signal, so these are the weakest verdicts we publish. They are not known to be wrong. Verify this figure.
Called bot-shaped on an address with no outflow at all (contradiction)
80 address(es) profiled, of which 0 are published.
Called a service on a single sampled payer (thin evidence)
535 address(es) profiled, of which 533 are published.
Current figures · snapshot 2026-10-27
Self-contradiction rate (lower bound)0 of 995 · 0% verify
Measured against ourselves and regenerated with each snapshot. The first figure being nought is not a claim of accuracy — see the note above it.
The same rate, priced. Those 533 addresses hold
$219,083.19 between them —
0.15% of everything received, a median of
$47.70 each. Both numbers are published because either alone
misleads. The count is the honest headline and stays first: 53.6% of the register
— 533 of 995 — does rest on one customer. The money says where that doubt actually sits — in very small addresses,
not in the figures this site leads with. We would rather you could see both than take our word for
which matters.
Until 2026-09-17 these two were published as one figure — an
“error rate” of 29.6%, being 143 of 483 published addresses. Every one of those 143 came from
the single-payer test. Nothing was removed and no address was re-graded: on 2026-09-17, 0 + 143 was the
same 143. See correction #9.
What happens when we test against known infrastructure
We hold 46 addresses hand-verified as
infrastructure — rails, routers, escrows and gateways, identified by bytecode or
published deployment, never by heuristic. Of the 18 our pipeline had profiled, it called
14 of them a real service.
Why these numbers differ. The 46 above is the test set — every address we can label with certainty, used to measure how often the classifier is wrong. It is 38 addresses removed from the register (24 rails, 5 disbursers and 9 other addresses that are not a service), plus 7 addresses that other lists name as rails, which we checked and found not deployed on Base, plus 1 stated gap. Only the first group is infrastructure we verified; the other two are recorded so they are never added by mistake. The 13 addresses identified as wallet software are not in the test set: they are a reclassification, not a removal, and stay in the register carrying the wallet verdict.
1 reached the registry.
The classifier did not stop them — a hand-maintained exclusion list did, and that list only ever contains what a human already went and found. Infrastructure of this shape that nobody has found yet is not excluded by anything.
What this number is not
—
This is a LOWER BOUND, not an accuracy figure.
—
It cannot see an agent wrongly EXCLUDED — only wrong verdicts among those published.
—
It cannot see a wrong verdict that is internally consistent.
—
The label set is adversarially biased: those addresses were hand-excluded BECAUSE they look like services.
Past snapshots are not recomputed under later rules. A snapshot is a record of what the
method in force that day produced. When the method changes, the change applies from that day
forward; earlier snapshots stand as published, and the version they were made under is stamped on
them. History is completed when recovered evidence proves a figure incomplete — and that is
always published as a correction — but it is never quietly
re-graded under a newer rule.
Version
Effective
What changed
v3.2
not recorded
The version in force for every snapshot this site has published. Its own adoption date was never recorded, and is not guessed here.
v3.2
2026-09-17
Display labels renamed and definitions rewritten. No rule, threshold or count changed.
This history begins where the record begins, and no earlier. The
version number in force today is v3.2. Searching every
commit of this codebase back to 2026-07-04, it is the only methodology version that has
ever appeared in the published pages: there is no v1.0, v2.0, v3.0 or v3.1 in the record, in our
internal documents, or in version control. The number was carried forward as a bare literal with
no changelog kept behind it. We could write four earlier rows that would look entirely reasonable.
We have not, because we cannot show them to be true, and a version history that is partly invented
is worth less than one that admits where it starts.
Corrections
Corrections are public and permanent. When a published figure turns out to be wrong, the
correction is published beside it and the original is not deleted.
The pipeline behind these figures has been checked by a second implementation — a
separate codebase that shares no code with the pipeline and reads the chain itself. It is
independent of the code, not of us: the same operator wrote and ran it.
Two audits exist and they count different things, which is why their totals differ:
The money primitives (2026-07-23) — 948 checks over the published figures,
zero pipeline findings.
The provenance grades (2026-08-13) — 643 grades recomputed from raw chain
data, 0 discrepancies. That is 643 addresses, not 643 checks.
And the limit, which is ours and is stated rather than buried: an audit
can show that the code does what we said. It cannot show that what we said was right. A second
implementation agreeing with the first proves the mechanism, not the premise — both inherit
the same sampling and the same manifest, so a rail missing from that manifest is a blind spot they
share. Only a check from outside our own definitions tests the premise, and that is owed.
The full correction log is at /corrections and the
reconciliation report at /audit. Both are published and linked from every page.
Every figure is reconstructed from public Base chain state. No API key, no account, no trust
required — open an address and compare the USDC transfers against what we show. Corrections to published
figures are logged with their date and reason.
AQUIX · an independent observatory of the x402 rail on Base·Measured daily at 07:00 UTC · Snapshot 2026-10-27 · Methodology v3.2 · Classifier v4 · Latest correction #10·No protocol pays to appear here
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